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SADAT v. AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION:
LIMITING CONSUMER REMEDIES UNDER
MAGNUSON-MOSS AND THE NEW CAR BUYER
PROTECTION ACT*
Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act' to increase consumer rights and protections relative to product warranties, and to provide new avenues
for consumer redress.2 The act created several important remedial
rights' including the right of a consumer," who obtains a full written
* 104 Ill. 2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997 (1984).
1. 15 U.S.C. §§2301-2312 (Supp. V 1981).
2. In its report to Congress, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce highlighted consumers' increasing resentment over their inability to have
defective products repaired. The Committee enunciated consumers' growing awareness that
the paper with the filigrees border bearing the bold caption "Warranty" or
"Guarantee" was often of no greater worth than the paper it was printed on.
Indeed, the many cases where a warranty or guarantee was ostensibly given the
old saying applied 'the bold print giveth, and the fine print taketh away.'
H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7701, 7711. The Committee reported that government officials were receiving a
multitude of complaints from irate automobile owners because manufacturers were
not performing in accordance with the warranties on their vehicles. Id. at 7708. Senator Robert Dole stated that the act was implemented to address four perceived needs:
"the need for consumer understanding, the need for minimum warranty protection
for the consumer, the need for the assurance of warranty performance, and the need
for better product reliability." 119 CONG. REC. 29489-90 (1973) (daily ed. Sept. 12,
1973) (statement of Senator Dole). For a complete discussion of the history behind
the Magnuson-Moss Act see Clark & Davis, Beefing Up Product Warranties: A New
Dimension in Consumer Protection,23 KAN. L. REV. 567 (1975) (Magnuson-Moss described as the most important development in warranty law since enactment of

UCC).
3. The Act allows consumers the remedy of repair, replacement or refund of a
defective product. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §101(10), 15 U.S.C. §2301(10)
(1981). If a buyer prevails in any action brought under section 101(10), the court may
award a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses (including attorney's fees) determined by the court to be reasonably incurred by the plaintiff in connection with the commencement and prosecution of the action. Id. §110(d)(2), 15
U.S.C. 2310(d)(2) (1981). In Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 433
A.2d 801 (1981), the consumer's attorney undertook the case on a contingency fee
basis, with a relatively small retainer. Id. at 58, 433 A.2d at 812. The court approved
a fee of $5,165 at an hourly rate of $75 an hour for actual time spent. Id. The court
took into account the difficulty of the litigation, the quality of the attorney's work,
and his experience in similar litigation. Id. at 59, 433 A.2d at 813. In Ventura, an
award was made even though no damage judgment was entered against Ford. Id. at
58, 433 A.2d at 812. The court stated that the mere fact that a plaintiff is entitled to
an award of nominal damages will support an award of attorney's fees. Id.
Courts do not award attorney's fees in a settled suit because such a suit does not
go to judgment. See R. BILLINGS, HANDLING AUTOMOBILE WARRANTY AND REPOSSESSION
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warranty, to demand replacement of a defective product from the
167 (1984) (fees not awarded if consumer failed to give the warrantor a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect) [hereinafter cited as R. BILLINGS].
The Magnuson-Moss Act allows consumers with small claims to consolidate their
actions in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount necessary to bring a class action
in district court. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §110(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. §2310(d)(3)
(1981). To invoke federal class action jurisdiction, three requirements must be met.
The plaintiff must show that (1) the amount in controversy of each individual claim
is at least $25; (2) the amount in controversy for all claims is at least $50,000; and (3)
the number of named plaintiffs is at least 100. Id. See generally Comment,
Magnuson-Moss Federal Court Class Actions-Federal Right Without A Federal Forum, 11 CuM. L. REV. 133 (1980) (full utilization of federal court class actions, as a
means of consumer redress, has not been realized).
The Act also provides incentive to manufacturers who set up arbitration programs for consumer disputes. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §110(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§2310(a)(1) (1981). See R. BILLINGS, supra at 137 (warranty can require purchaser to
go to arbitration before proceeding in court). If a buyer does not like an arbitration
award, which is binding on the manufacturer, he or she can turn it down and file an
action. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §110(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §2310(a)(1) (1981). The
manufacturer can then introduce the result of arbitration in court. Id. For a discussion on the success of such arbitration programs see R. BILLINGS, supra at 70 (requests for arbitration and mediation are running 8,000 per month for General Motors'
program alone). See generally Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act Upon Consumer Product Warranties,55 N.C.L. REV. 835 (1977) (discussing the proposed rules
setting forth minimum requirements for dispute mechanisms); Comment, The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act: Protecting Consumers Through Product Warranties, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163 (1976) (the
purpose of the dispute mechanisms is to settle complaints fairly and expeditiously).
4. Under the Act, a consumer is a buyer or other qualified transferee of a "consumer product." Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §101(3), 15 U.S.C. §2301(3) (1981).
See Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1981) (automobile buyers
considered consumer under Magnuson-Moss). A consumer product is defined as "any
tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally
used for personal, family or household purposes." Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
§101(1), 15 U.S.C. §2301(1) (1981). The term "consumer goods" as used in the U.C.C.
differs from that in Magnuson-Moss. Under the U.C.C., consumer goods are those
goods that "are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household
purposes." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §9-109 (1983). Under Magnuson-Moss, however, the
classification is made from the vantage point of the seller or manufacturer.
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §101(1), 15 U.S.C. §2301(1) (1981). It does not matter
how a particular buyer uses the goods as long as such goods are "normally used" for
consumer purposes. Id. See also Schroder, Private Actions Under the MagnusonMoss Warranty Act, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1978) (discussing differences between consumers under U.C.C. & Magnuson-Moss). One court has ruled that a business owner
of a pickup truck has a cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Act as a "consumer." Birchwood Restaurant Inc. v. Casco Bay Motors, No. CV-78-1411 (Cumberland County Ct., Maine July 10, 1979). See generally Brickley, The Magnuson-Moss
Act - An Analysis of the Efficacy of Federal Warranty Regulation as a Consumer
Protection Tool, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73 (1978) (consumers, under MagnusonMoss, include any buyer or transferee who acquires the product during the term of
the warranty).
5. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §104(a), 15 U.S.C. 2304(a) (1981), states that
to be designed as a full warranty, the following minimum standards must be met:
(1) The warrantor must agree to repair any product that fails to conform to the
warranty, within a reasonable time, and at no cost to the consumer.
(2) The warrantor cannot limit the duration of any implied warranties.
(3) If the warrantor wishes to limit consequential damages he must so designate conspicuously and on the face of the warranty.
(4) The consumer is allowed to choose replacement or refund if the seller canCASES
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manufacturer.' If the manufacturer does not comply with the consumer's demand the consumer is entitled to bring an action against
the manufacturer seeking equitable relief.7 In Sadat v. American
Motors Corporation,'the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether the equitable relief entailed in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act allows a consumer to obtain a court order requiring a
manufacturer to replace a defective product, absent a showing of
two traditional equity considerations: irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law.9 Disregarding the broad remedial provision of
the Act, the court held that these standard preconditions for equitanot repair the defective product within a reasonable time. Id.
The Act requires that the written warranty be clearly and conspicuously designated either "full warranty" or a "limited warranty." Id. §101(6), 15 U.S.C. §2301(6)
(1981). These are the exclusive designations under the Act. In Federal Trade Commission v. Virginia Homes Mfg. Corp. 509 F. Supp. 51, 57 (D.C. Md. 1981), the district court ruled that a designation such as "[mianufacturer's warranty and limitation
of remedy" would violate the Act. See generally Strasser, Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act: An Overview and Comparison with U.C.C. Coverage, Disclaimer,and Remedies
in Consumer Warranties,27 MERCER L. REv. 1111 (1976) (theory behind the designation is that competitive pressure will force many, if not most, merchants to use a
"full" warranty).
6. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §104(a)(1)(d), 15 U.S.C. §2304(a)(1)(d) (1981).
The Act provides a specific definition of "remedy":
The term "remedy" means whichever of the following actions the warrantor
elects:
(a) repair,
(b) replacement, or
(c) refund:
except that the warrantor may not elect refund unless (i) the warrantor is unable to provide replacement and repair is not commercially practicable or cannot be timely made, or (ii) the consumer is willing to accept such refund.
Id. §101(10), 15 U.S.C. §2301(10) (1981).
7. Id. §110(d), 15 U.S.C. §2310(d) (1981). A consumer who is injured by the failure of a warrantor to comply with any obligations under a written warranty "may
bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief." Id.
Only the warrantor making the full warranty may be sued under the Act. Id.
§110(f), 15 U.S.C. §2310(f) (1981). In the sale of new cars this is the manufacturer.
Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1981) (private litigant
brought suit against automobile manufacturer); Lieb v. American Motors Corp., 538
F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (private litigant sought injunction against manufacturer). However, if under state law the dealer has adopted the warranty, it, too, may
be sued under the Act. 16 C.F.R. §700.4 (1982).
8. Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 104 Ill. 2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997 (1984).
9. Id. at 110, 470 N.E.2d at 1000. The injury will be an irreparable one if the
remedy at law is inadequate. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co. v. Alexander, 411 A.2d
74 (Me. 1980). The remedy at law may be inadequate because (1) the relief which the
court of law is empowered to grant is not the kind the situation demands, (2) the
amount of damages cannot be ascertained with reasonable accuracy, or (3) the procedures at law cannot be adapted to meet the needs of the situation. H. MCCLINTOCK,
MCCLINTOCK ON EQUITY 103 (2d ed. 1948).
The earliest case on the subject of adequacy of the remedy at law, and perhaps
the one most frequently cited, is Pusey v. Pusey, 1 Vern. 273 (1684). That case involved the possession of a horn given to the Pusey family by the Danish King Canute.
Id. The bill for specific performance was maintained. Id. Because the object was so
unique, the court found the plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law. Id.
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ble relief must still be established before a court will issue a
mandatory injunction.'0
On April 3, 1979, Roxanne Sadat purchased a new American
Motors Automobile." The car was covered by a full 12 month/12,000
mile written warranty.' 2 During the warranty period the vehicle exhibited several defects requiring Sadat to return the car to the
dealer on several occasions.' 3 After attempts to repair the vehicle
failed, Sadat requested a replacement car pursuant to section
104(a)(4) of the Magnuson-Moss Act.' 4 The manufacturer refused,
so Sadat filed a complaint in state court seeking a mandatory injunction ordering AMC to replace the vehicle.'"
The trial court granted AMC's motion to dismiss, holding that
the complaint did not state a cause of action."' The appellate court
10. Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 104 Ill. 2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997 (1984).
11. Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 114 I1. App. 3d 376, 448 N.E.2d 900
(1983), aff'd, 104 Ill. 2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997 (1984).
12. Sadat, 104 I1. 2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997. Among all domestic and foreign marketers of new cars, only American Motors Corporation offers a full warranty. See R.
BILLINGS, supra note 3, at 171.
13. Sadat's complaint alleged the following defects: the brakes often failed or
were difficult to engage, the steering column vibrated excessively, the transmission
slipped from park to reverse, the engine leaked oil, the car dieseled after the engine
was turned off, and the passenger compartment was permeated with the smell of exhaust. Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d at 107, 470 N.E.2d at 998.
14. The Act provides that "if the product contains a defect or malfunction after
a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantors to remedy the defects or malfunction in such product, such warrantor must permit the consumer to elect either a refund for, or replacement without charge of such product." Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act §104(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. §2304(a)(4) (1981)..For a discussion of what criteria are required in order for a warranty to be designated as "full" under section 104 of the Act
see supra note 5.
15. Sadat sought either replacement of the automobile with a new vehicle of
equal or superior quality, or a refund of the purchase price, plus attorney's fees and
costs. Complaint at Law, Count I D1, Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 104 Ill. 2d
105, 470 N.E.2d 997 (1984).
16. Sadat v. American Motors Corp., No. 81 CH 9469 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. 1982),
aff'd, 114 Ill. App. 3d 376, 448 N.E.2d 900 (1983), aff'd, 104 Ill. 2d 105, 470 N.E.2d
997 (1984). The Act provides that suit can be brought in a state court or United
States District Court. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §110(d), 15 U.S.C. §2310(d)
(1981). District court suits may only be filed if damages of $50,000 are alleged. Id.
Annot., 59 A.L.R. FED. 460 (1982). Automobile warranty claims rarely reach the jurisdictional limit. District court claims, based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C.
§1332 (1981), will only occasionally satisfy the customary $10,000 requirement for
diversity cases. See Lieb v. American Motors Corp., 538 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(rising prices of cars, however, will place more litigation concerning warranties above
the $10,000 limit). Whether an allegation of federal diversity jurisdiction will lower
the amount in controversy from $50,000 to $10,000 has not been settled. The court in
Pratt v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Pa. 1979), accepted diversity
jurisdiction of a Magnuson-Moss case where the amount in controversy was $16,745.
Id. Another court dismissed a Magnuson-Moss claim for $33,000, and ruled that the
plaintiff could proceed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction with the U.C.C. warranty
claim. Fleming v. Apollo Motor Homes, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 408, 409-11 (M.D.N.C. 1980).
The statute of limitations for breach of warranty actions is four years. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 26, §2-725(1) (1983). A cause of action for breach of warranty accrues when
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affirmed the lower court's order.1 7 The court ruled that because the
Act did not expressly create statutory injunctive rights for consumers, the plaintiff must show that she suffered irreparable harm and
that she did not have an adequate remedy at law. 8
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court decided the issue of
whether a consumer must prove traditional equity prerequisites, in
addition to the expressed requisites of the Magnuson-Moss Act, in
order to obtain replacement for a defective product." The issue was
one of first impression. The court held that because the Act did not
specifically afford consumers injunctive relief, common law equity
criteria must be satisfied.20 The court, ruling that immunity from
pleading irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law is limited to suits brought by governmental agencies or private parties
acting in the public interest," concluded that its decision should not
defeat the congressional intent of providing consumers with effective
remedies against recalcitrant manufacturers."
The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis by noting the
general rule regarding pleading according to a statute, a which provides that a plaintiff need only show what is expressly required in a
statute in order to receive the statutory remedy.24 The court stated
that a consumer in possession of a defective product, covered by a
full written warranty, has a cause of action for damages if the warthe dealer tenders delivery of the automobile. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §725(2) (1983).
See also Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 545 P.2d 371 (1976) (action for
breach of warranty was time barred since suit was brought more than four years after
delivery). See generally Strasser, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: An Overview and
Comparison with U.C.C. Coverage, Disclaimer,and Remedies in Consumer Warranties, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1111 (1976) (discussion of relationship between state law and
the Magnuson-Moss Act).
17. Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 114 Ill. App. 3d 376, 448 N.E.2d 900
(1983), afl'd, 104 Ill. 2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997 (1984).
18. Id.
19. Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 104 IUI.2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997 (1984).
20. Id. at 116, 470 N.E.2d at 1002-03.
21. Id. at 114, 470 N.E.2d at 1001.
22. Id. at 1110, 470 N.E.2d at 1000.
23. Id.
24. Id. ("when pleading according to a form prescribed by statute, it is not necessary, in order to obtain the relief authorized by the act, to state more than the act
requires") (quoting Mullarkey v. Trautvetter, 276 Ill. 409, 411-12, 114 N.E.2d 920,
921 (1916). Similarly, in Mendelson v. General Motors Corp., 105 Misc. 2d 346, 432
N.Y.S.2d 132 (1980), the court held that plaintiff need allege only the facts required
by the Magnuson-Moss Act. Id. at 350, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 136. In Mendelson, the defendant sought to dismiss two causes of action claiming violations of the Act on the
grounds that the plaintiff had not notified the defendant prior to commencement of a
class action. Id. at 349, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 134. Although the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act permits warrantors to impose on the consumer a duty to notify, it does not by its
own terms require such notice. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §111(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§211(b)(1) (1981). Accordingly, the plaintiff stated a cause of action under the Act,
and the defendants' motion to dismiss was denied. Mendelson v. General Motors
Corp., 105 Misc. 2d 346, 432 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1980).
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rantor cannot repair the vehicle within a reasonable time.25 The
court held that these same criteria, however, are insufficient to state
a cause of action for injunctive relief. 26 The court concluded that
Congress did not intend to establish injunctive relief for consumers
on a showing of a statutory violation because it did not explicitly
grant consumers injunctive rights, as it did when it gave the United
States Attorney General and Federal Trade Commission the power
27
to restrain noncompliance with the Act.
The supreme court noted that no statutes have been construed
as relaxing the traditional requirements for an injunction when a
private party plaintiff seeks to enforce private rights.28 The court
found that the rule concerning immunity from pleading irreparable
harm and an inadequate remedy at law applies only to governmental
agencies seeking equitable relief or private parties seeking equitable
relief to protect the public interest.2" The court realized that the
25. Sadat., 104 11. 2d at 111, 470, N.E.2d at 1000. As in other areas of contract
law, it is incumbent on a plaintiff in a warranty action to use such means as are
reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize damages. Annot. 66 A.L.R.
3d 1162 (1982). See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 127
(1935) (law seeks to encourage the avoidance of loss by denying the wronged party a

recovery for such loss as he could have reasonably avoided). Additionally, the burden
is on the defendant to prove facts which will bring mitigation into issue. Royal Lincoln Mercury Sales, Inc. v. Wallace, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1262, 415 So. 2d 1024 (Miss.
1982).
26. Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997. "We disagree and for the reasons to
follow, hold that a complaint for injunctive relief under section 110(d)(1) 15 U.S.C.
§2310(d)(1) of the Act is insufficient absent the traditional showing of irreparable
harm and inadequate remedy at law." Id. at 110, 470 N.E.2d at 1000.
27. Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d 105, 110, 470 N.E.2d 997, 1001. Section 110(d)(1) of the
Act specifically grants injunctive rights to the United States Attorney General and
the Federal Trade Commission to enforce compliance with the Act. Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act §110(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. §2310(d)(1) (1981). The United States Attorney
General and the Federal Trade Commission have the power to seek injunctive relief
to restrain a warrantor from making a deceptive warranty, failing to comply with
requirements, or violating any prohibition under the Act. Id. §110(d)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§2310(d)(1) (1981). The FTC will probably be the primary public agency enforcing
the Act because it has special powers under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45 (Supp. V 1981), to seek penalties up to $10,000 against warrantors who violate the Act, 15 U.S.C. §45(M) (1981). See generally Schmitt & Kovac,
Magnuson-Moss v. State Protective Consumer Legislation: The Validity of a
Stricter State Standard of Warranty Protection, 30 ARK. L. REV. 21 (1976) (the FTC
has given clear indication that state consumer laws enacting a higher standard of
consumer protection will be fully upheld and honored); Comment, The Federal Consumer Warranty Act and Its Effect on State Law, 43 TENN. L. REV. 429 (1976) (discussing enforcement by the FTC).
28. Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d 105, 113, 470 N.E.2d 997, 1001.
29. Id. at 114, 470 N.E.2d at 1001-02. The court cited as authority, MiddletonKiern v. Stone, 655 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1981) (employee sued employer for discrimination); Smallwood v. National Can Co., 583 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1978) (suit for employment discrimination); United States v. Hayes Int'l. Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir.
1969) (attorney general filed complaint for violation of Civil Rights Act); City of
Highland Park v. County of Cook, 37 Ill. App. 3d 15, 344 N.E.2d 665 (1975) (city filed
action to enjoin Cook County and its highway superintendent from constructing a
highway to replace an existing two-lane highway in the city).
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average consumer was virtually unable to obtain injunctive relief,
apparently viewing the award of money damages and attorney's fees
as satisfactory redress under the Act.30
The Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Sadat is incorrect for
three reasons. First, the court completely gutted the Act, ignoring
legislative intent and the Act's plain language. 1 Second, the court
set dangerous new precedent by disregarding standard principles of
statutory construction.32 Finally, the decision is unsupported by the
cited case law. 33
Congressional concern with the inadequacy of existing warranty
laws prompted the passage of the Magnuson-Moss Act.3 The legislature intended to provide consumers with effective warranties and
an efficient means to enforce those warranties. 5 Section 104 of the
Magnuson-Moss Act specifically states that the consumer can obtain
replacement of a defective product if the warrantor cannot repair
the defects within a reasonable time.3" The "warrantor must permit
the consumer to elect either a refund for, or replacement without
charge of, such [defective] product. 3 7 The Illinois Supreme Court
disregarded that language and required Sadat to establish irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law. To do so, a buyer would
have to show that the product was unique or otherwise unobtainable, 38 an incredible burden in a nation where most products are
mass-produced.
The Illinois Supreme Court essentially revoked a remedy the
2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997.
30. Sadat, 104 Ill.
31. For a discussion of the legislative intent of the Magnuson-Moss Act see infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text for applicable statutory construction rules.
33. For relevant case law see infra notes 42-75 and accompanying text.
34. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702. Arguing before the Senate on the need for new legislation,
Senator Frank E. Moss, a co-sponsor of the Act, stated that consumers were frustrated because of a lack of "meaningful remedies" for injuries resulting from breach
of warranty. 119 CONG. REc. 29480 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1973) (statement of Senator
Moss). The report quoted that the conclusion of the Presidential Task Force on Appliance Warranties and Service was that consumers lacked "practical means of compelling manufacturers to perform their warranty obligations." H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS. 7701, 7710.
35. For a discussion of the purpose of the Magnuson-Moss Act see supra note 2.
36. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §104(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. §2304(a)(4) (1981). In
Pratt v. Winnebago Indus. Inc., 463 F. Supp. 709, 713 (W.D. Pa. 1979), the court held
that the Magnuson-Moss Act "specifies with utter clarity that a consumer has the
right to elect to receive a refund [or replacement]... if the product has defects which
survive a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor to repair them."
37. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §104(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. 2304(a)(4).
38. See Fortner v. Wilson, 22 Okla. 563, 216 P.2d 299 (1950) (general rule is
that automobiles are never considered unique chattel); G. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQuriT §42 (1948) (while uniqueness is variously defined, the underlying principle is
that the chattel cannot be duplicated in the market).
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Magnuson-Moss Act specifically provides. This ruling demonstrates
the court's complete disregard for well established principles of statutory construction."9 A statute should be read as a whole to give
effect to every provision, so that no part will be superfluous."' In
addition, remedial statutes, like Magnuson-Moss, which remedy a
defect in the common law or a pre-existing body of statutory law,
are to be given a liberal construction.41
Furthermore, the decision in Sadat is incorrect because it is unsupported by the cited case law. The Illinois Supreme Court erroneously concluded that the Act was not sufficiently explicit to allow
consumers an injunction.4 ' In reaching this conclusion, one case the
court relied on was Oscar George Electric Company v. Metropolitan
39. 2A A. SUTHERLAND,

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§46.06 (4th ed. 1973) (an ele-

mentary rule of statutory construction is that effect must be given, if possible, to
every word, clause and sentence of a statute).
40. Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d at 117, 470 N.E.2d at 1003 (Simon, J., dissenting). "A
statute should be read as a whole in order to give effect to its purpose." Id. at 118,
470 N.E.2d at 1003. See Morris v. Broadview, 385 II. 228, 231-32, 52 N.E.2d 769, 770
(1944) (statute should be interpreted according to its intent and meaning, so as to
accomplish its general objective).
In the appellate court, AMC raised the argument that Congress' use of "and" in
the phrase "damages and other equitable relief" in section 110(d)(1) of the Act, indicated that Congress intended damages to be the sole remedy. Brief for Respondent at
19, Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 114 Ill. App. 3d 376, 448 N.E.2d 900 (1983),
aff'd, 104 Ill. 2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997 (1984). AMC conceded that Sadat would be
entitled to maintain her action if Congress had used "or" instead of "and" in section
110(d)(1). Brief for Respondent at 19, Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 114 Ill. App.
3d 376, 448 N.E.2d 900 (1983), af'd, 104 Ill. 2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997 (1984).
41. E. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §251 (1940). "Remedial statutes
should be given a liberal construction, in order to effectuate the purpose of the legislature, or to advance the remedy intended, or to accomplish the objective sought, and
all matters fairly within the scope of the statute should be included." Id. at 493.
Remedial legislation is often in derogation of the common law. Id. These statutes
receive a liberal construction in order to carry out the purpose of the statute and
secure a more effective, speedier, and simpler administration of the law. Id. at 496.
See also F. MCCAFFEREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §74 (1953) (liberal construction
expands the meaning of the law to embrace cases which are clearly within the spirit
or reason of the law, or within the evil which it was designed to remedy). In Skelton
v. General Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1981), the Magnuson-Moss Act was
described as "a remedial statute designed to protect consumers..." Id. at 313.
42. Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997. The Sadat court looked to prior case
law involving other statutes which held that injunctive relief must be expressly authorized in order to forego conventional equity prerequisites. Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1981) (Revised Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §11503(c) (Supp. IV 1980), was found to expressly authorize
injunctions to restrain violations of the Act); People ex rel. Carpentier v. Goers, 10
Ill. 2d 272, 170 N.E.2d 159 (1960) (Motor Vehicle Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 /2, §2116 (1979), specifically provided for an injunction "to enforce provisions of the Act");
Oscar George Electric Co. v. Metropolitan Fair and Exposition Auth., 104 Il1. App. 3d
957, 433 N.E.2d 958 (1982) (wherein section 25 of the Metropolitan Fair and Exposition Authority Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §1245 (1979), allows bidders who submit
bids in compliance with the Act to "bring suit in equity"); People v. Keeven, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 91, 385 N.E.2d 804 (1979) (injunctive relief expressly authorized to prevent
violations of the Environmental Protection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, §1042(d)
(1983).
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Fair and Exposition Authority.43 In Oscar George, the plaintiff
sought an injunction pursuant to the Metropolitan Fair and Exposition Authority Act.4 Although the Act did not specifically grant injunctive relief, the court upheld the plaintiff's request for an injunction."' The language of the Metropolitan Fair and Exposition
Authority Act and the Magnuson-Moss Act are quite similar. The
Metropolitan Fair and Exposition Authority Act allows an injured
4
party to "bring suit in equity" to enforce provisions of the statute. 1
Similarly, the Magnuson-Moss Act allows consumers, who have been
injured by a warrantor's failure to comply with an obligation under
the Act, to "bring suit for. . .equitable relief. '47 The rationale of the
Oscar George decision can be extended to Sadat. Oscar George held
that when the legislature grants general equitable relief it is im4
pliedly authorizing injunctive relief.
Despite Oscar George, the Illinois Supreme Court in Sadat held
that the phrase "equitable relief' did not include injunctive relief
because Congress specifically gave injunctive power only to the
United States Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission,
according to section 110(d)(1) of the Act.4'9 The issue of whether the
Magnuson-Moss Act is sufficiently specific to allow a consumer to
seek an injunction was decided by a federal court in Lieb v. American Motors Corporation." The Lieb court ruled that the term "eq43. Oscar George Electric Co. v. Metropolitan Fair and Exposition Auth., 104
Ill. App. 3d 957, 433 N.E.2d 958 (1982).
44. Metropolitan Fair and Exposition Authority Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
§1245 (1983).
45. Oscar George, 104 Ill.
App. 3d at 960, 433 N.E.2d at 961.
46. Section 25 of the Metropolitan Fair and Exposition Authority Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 85, §1245 (1983), allows bidders who submit bids in compliance with the Act
to "bring suit in equity...to compel compliance with the provisions of [the] Act relating to the awarding of contracts by the Board."
47. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act §110(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. §2310(d)(1) (1981).
48. Other courts have granted statutory injunctions without a statute specifically granting injunctive relief. See American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. United States,
105 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1939)(injunction sought pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §608(a) (West 1970)); Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Torr, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937) (injunction sought pursuant to the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §78(i) (West 1970), which provides that an injured
party "may sue in law or in equity" to enforce the Act); Securities and Exchange
Comm. v. R.J. Allen and Assoc., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (injunction
sought pursuant to Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §78(i) (West
1970)); Davis v. Huttig Sash and Door Co., 288 F. Supp. 82 (W.D. Okla. 1968) (injunction sought pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §158 (West
1970), which does not provide any remedies for violation of the Act).
49. Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 104 I1. 2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997 (1984).
"Had Congress intended to establish statutory injunctive rights for consumers, to issue solely on a showing of a statutory violation, it would have done so in the express
manner of the respective statute described in. . .section 110(d)(1) of the Act." Id. at
110, 470 N.E.2d at 1001.
50. Lieb v. American Motors Corp., 538 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The
plaintiff in Lieb sought an order directing AMC to notify current and prospective
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uitable relief" entailed in section 110(c)(1) of the Act was sufficient
to allow consumers injunctive relief.51 The court held that section
110(d)(1) of the Act should not be read as limiting or imposing restrictions on section 110(c)(1). 52 That court found that Congress
used the broad term "equitable relief' when referring to private actions, and a narrower subset of that relief when relating to government prosecuted suits.
The Sadat court held that a private litigant seeking injunctive
relief pursuant to a statute must always show conventional equity
preconditions. To support this holding, the court relied on the
United States Supreme Court decision in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Company. 3 Rondeau, however, is inapplicable to the facts in
Sadat because Rondeau involved an implied cause of action for injunctive relief, not a statutory right. When dealing with an implied
right to equitable relief, traditional equity requirements apply. 4
The opposite is true when dealing with a statute like the MagnusonMoss Act, which specifically provides for a cause of action and a
remedy 55 Unlike Magnuson-Moss, the statute under which Rondeau
was brought does not provide any penalty for violation, nor does it
mandate any civil remedies." The Magnuson-Moss Act, however,
does expressly provide for a cause of action and specific remedies for
57
violation of the Act.
owners of the rollover danger of Jeeps. Id.
51. Id. In Lieb, AMC argued that the phrase "equitable relief" did not include
injunctive relief since the Act expressly provided for an injunction only in section
110(c)(1). Lieb, 538 F. Supp. at 134. AMC contended that Congress meant to limit
such relief to government prosecuted suits. Id. The Lieb court rejected this argument
stating: "[a]lthough this argument is not without some plausibility, it is inconsistent
with the general rule that absent express limitations a statute will not be interpreted
to narrow the scope of equitable remedies, including injunctions." Id. at 136. See also
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (both general and specific provisions of a
statute are given effect unless clear Congressional intent to the contrary); E. CRAWFORD, supra note 40, at 265 (where a statute contains both general and specific provisions, the sections must be read in harmony with all other provisions of the act).
52. Lieb v. American Motors Corp., 538 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). "It would
be unreasonable to interpret Congress' broad mandate to the consumer more narrowly than its precise authorization to the Attorney General." Id. at 134.
53. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975). In Rondeau, 422 U.S.
at 55, a private litigant sought injunctive relief under 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 894 (1934) (amended at 15 U.S.C. §78(m)(d) (Supp. III
1979). The United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must show conventional equity criteria. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49, 61 (1975).
54. See Estate of Presley v. Rossen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (under an
implied cause of action for injunctive relief the plaintiff needed to show that he suffered irreparable damage, that the balance of the hardships weighed in his favor, and
that the interests of the general public were favored).
55. See supra note 32 and accompanying text for discussion of remedies under
Magnuson-Moss.
56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 894 (1934) (amended at 15 U.S.C.
§78(m)(d) (Supp. III 1979).
57. For further discussion of remedies under Magnuson-Moss see supra notes 3-
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The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the only instances in
which irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law need not
be shown is when suit is brought by a governmental agency or a
private party acting in the public interest." This viewpoint is unsupported by the case law cited in Sadat. The Illinois Supreme
Court did not apply the cases it cited to support Sadat's position
that private plaintiffs need not show traditional equity criteria when
pleading pursuant to a statute.5 6 The court used these same cases,
however, to support its holding that injunctive relief must be expressly authorized before a court will issue an injunction."0
The court in Sadat relied on two United States district court
cases as authority that conventional equity pleading requirements
need not be shown when the plaintiff is litigating on behalf of the
public.6 ' The court interpreted the violation of a statute, injurious to
the public welfare, as superseding the need for standard equity demands. 2 A careful examination of those cases, however, demonstrates that the plaintiffs were not acting in support of the public
interest, but rather were involved in litigation solely for their own
benefit.6 3 The plaintiffs in both cases were trying to vindicate their
7 and accompanying text.
58. Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d 105, 107, 470 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (1984).
59. In Oscar George Electric Co. v. Metropolitan Fair & Exposition Auth., 104
Ill. App. 3d 957, 433 N.E.2d 958 (1982), the plaintiff, a private party, obtained a
preliminary injunction against both a governmental body and a private party. The
Oscar George court did not limit the pleading exemption solely to the government
body. Id. Likewise, in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d
255 (10th Cir. 1981), a private railway company sought an injunction pursuant to a
statutory violation. The court held that the plaintiff did not need to show traditional
equity criteria. Id. The Atchison court specifically denounced a prior decision which
held that the rule governing immunity from pleading standard equity requirements
was confined to persons acting in the public interest. Id. "The rule [regarding the
exception to pleading conventional equity requirements] has also been applied to
statutes which do not protect the public health." Id. at 259.
60. Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d at 112, 470 N.E.2d at 1000-01.
61. Middleton-Kiern v. Stone, 655 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1981) (private litigant
sought an injunction against discriminatory employment practices); Smallwood v. National Can Co., 583 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1978) (private litigant sought an injunction
against discriminatory employment practices).
62. Sadat, 104 11. 2d 105, 470 N.E.2d 997. "Such an injury necessitates the
statutory authorization for equitable pleading requirements." Id. at 111, 470 N.E.2d
at 1001.
63. Both Middleton-Kiern and Smallwood involved actions brought pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V 1981). Title
VII provides for the issuance of an injunction between private parties when the plaintiff shows that discriminatory employment practices have occurred. 42 U.S.C. §2000e5 (1981). In both cases, the plaintiffs had obtained "right to sue letters" from the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The EEOC issues a "right to sue letter" if, after investigation, it determines that there is not reasonable cause to believe
the charge of discrimination is true. 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1981). In Middleton-Kiern,655
F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1981), and Smallwood, 583 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1978), the EEOC
apparently determined that the plaintiffs' charges of discrimination were not true,
and refused to seek an injunction. Consequently, the plaintiffs were not seeking equi-
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own private rights in situations where the agency charged with protecting the public concern refused to act. 4 The facts of these cases,
therefore, fail to support the court's opinion that these litigants were
protecting public rights.
Justice Simon's dissent in Sadat noted the impracticalities of
the majority's decision., Simon observed that if a buyer sues a manufacturer for money damages for a defective automobile, the consumer must suffer the added expense of obtaining alternate transportation. 6 The buyer therefore assumes a financial burden that
must be endured for several years while a buyer litigates an action
for damages. Additionally, a plaintiff may not always be able to recover this expense in the damage award. Therefore, the most effitable relief to benefit some general public interest.
64. Middleton-Kiern v. Stone, 655 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1981); Smallwood v. National Can Co., 583 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1978).
65. Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d at 117, 470 N.E.2d at 1003 (Simon, J., dissenting).
66. Id. The customary measure of damages for a breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the automobile accepted, and the value it would have had if it had been as warranted. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 26, §2-714(2) (1979); Annot., 36 A.L.R. 3d 125 (1981). Proving the market price of
the defective vehicle at the time of acceptance is difficult. R. BILLINGS, supra note 3,
at 158. A court can admit the plaintiff's testimony as to the fair market value of the
vehicle to ease this problem. See Chrysler-Plymouth City, Inc. v. Guerro, 620 S.W.2d
700 (Texas 1981) (testimony as to value of used car); Williams v. Hyatt Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 308, 269 S.E.2d 184 (1980) (testimony of plaintiff admitted as to new car). The court, instead, may permit the jury to assess damages on
evidence as to repair costs. McGrady v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 46 Ill. App. 3d 136,
360 N.E.2d 818 (1977). A court may also accept evidence of the price the plaintiff
received upon resale or trade-in as proof of the value of the defective car. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 26, §2-714(1) (1979); Bayne v. Nall Motors, Inc., 23 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
1137(Iowa 1973) (price received upon trade-in as proof of value).
Incidental and consequential damages may be awarded in a breach of warranty
action. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §2-715 (1979). Incidental damages include expenses reasonably incurred in the care and custody of the automobile. Id. §2-715(1). Consequential damages include personal losses incurred by the buyer which were proximately caused by the defective automobile. Id. §2-715(2). Incidental damages might
include towing or repair charges not reimbursed under warranty. Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977). Incidental damages can also include
storage charges after the dealer refuses to take back the automobile. Lloyd v. Classic
Motor Coaches, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ohio 1974). Consequential damages have
been awarded for loss of the use of the automobile resulting from its defective condition. Ford Motors Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1978). One court has awarded
damages based on wages lost during negotiations with the dealer. Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 527 (Ind. 1971). See generally Goldstein, Pleading
and Proving Special Damages, PROOF OF DAMAGES (IICLE) §1.2 (1981) (discussion of
practical problems encountered by practitioners in pleading and proving special damages in Illinois).
The general rule is that punitive damages are not available for breach of warranty. Welken v. Conley, 252 N.W.2d 311 (N.D. 1977). Nevertheless, punitive damages may be recovered if the breach of warranty involves tortious conduct. See Ford
Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1978) (right to punitive damages for tortious conduct recognized in situations involving deliberate, willful, malicious fraud or
wanton and gross negligence).

1985]

Sadat v. American Motors Corporation

cient remedy is replacement of the vehicle." This is a remedy Congress intended to give consumers, and a remedy the Illinois Supreme
Court denied Sadat.
Since the Sadat case was filed, Illinois enacted legislation aimed
at alleviating the burden: on consumers associated with damage
awards in automobile warranty suits. Illinois' New Car Buyer Protection Act,"8 commonly called a lemon law, 9 provides that a consumer can obtain replacement of a defective automobile during the
first year of operation if the warrantor cannot repair the same defects after four attempts or an accumulative total of thirty days in
the repair shop."0 The lemon law, which extends the remedy of re67. Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d at 117, 370 N.E.2d at 1003 (Simon, J., dissenting).
68. New Car Buyer Protection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §§1201-08 (1983).
For a discussion of the Act see infra note 70.
69. Nineteen other states have enacted similar "lemon-laws." See ALASKA STAT.
§101 (1984); CAL. CIv. CODE §1793.2 (West 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §42-179
(West 1983-84); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§5001-09 (1983); 1983 Fla. Laws 229; 1983
Me. Legis. Serv. 610; 1983 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 41 (Law. Co-op); MINN. STAT.
§325F.665 (1982);1983 Mont. Laws 270; 1982 Neb. Laws 431; 1983 Nev. Stat. 610;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §357-D (1983); 1983 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 1026 (West); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW §198-a (Consol. 1983-84); OR. REV. STAT. §§646.315-.375 (1983); 1983 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 4134 (Vernon); 1983 Wash. Laws 1258; 1983 Wis. Legis. Serv. 790
(West); Wyo. STAT. §40-17-101 (1983).
The following provisions are characteristic of lemon laws, but not all of them are
found in every law:
Mechanical defects that substantially impair the use, market value or safety of
the automobile must be repaired in four attempts, or thirty days in the repair
shop. The statutory warranty period is one year or 12,000 miles whichever occurs first after delivery of the car. A consumer's rights under the lemon law
must be fully disclosed in the manufacturer's warranty or owner's manual. The
consumer must use consumer arbitration which complies with Federal Trade
Commission standards, before bringing an action under the lemon law.
Kentucky and North Carolina enacted legislation that differs from true lemonlaws. The North Carolina statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. §25-2-103(1)(d) (1983), eliminates
the privity requirements under the Uniform Commercial Code in motor vehicle warranty actions. U.C.C. §2-313 (1981). Vertical privity is that contractual relationship
which exists between parties within the distribution chain. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §11-2 (2d ed. 1980).
The Kentucky statute, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§367.860-865 (Baldwin 1982), requires
automobile manufacturers to establish informal dispute mechanisms to resolve consumer complaints. See supra note 3 on dispute settlement mechanisms under the
Magnuson-Moss Act. Neither the North Carolina nor the Kentucky statute provide
for a refund or replacement remedy. As of this writing, there are no reported decisions interpreting any state lemon law.
70. New Car Buyer Protection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §1203(a)(1)(2)
(1983). The Act applies to vehicles sold after January 1, 1984. Id. §1208. The Act
provides for replacement or refund of a defective automobile. Id. §1204(a). If the
consumer brings suit for refund, the warrantor can deduct a reasonable allowance for
consumer's use of the car. Id. §1203(c). A reasonable allowance for use of a car is the
amount directly attributable to the "wear and tear incurred by the new car as a result
of it having been used prior to the first report of a nonconformity to the seller, and
during any subsequent period in which it is not out of service by reason of repair." Id.
Before a consumer may bring an action for replacement or refund of a defective
car, the consumer must submit to an informal settlement procedure. New Car Buyer
Protection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §1204(a) (1983). The findings of the arbitra-
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placement to vehicles covered by limited warranties, was designed to
cure problems associated with both the Uniform Commercial Code
and Magnuson-Moss. A consumer electing to proceed under the
New Car Buyer Protection Act,
however, automatically relinquishes
7 1
any rights under the U.C.C..

The decision in Sadat will have a broad impact on Illinois consumers who obtain full written warranties on mass produced products. Consumers can never obtain replacement of a defective product because it is virtually impossible to show irreparable harm and
an inadequate remedy at law. The Sadat decision, however, will
have a narrow impact on automobile warranty cases brought under
Magnuson-Moss, because the only manufacturer offering a full warranty is American Motors Corporation. 72 Additionally, Illinois' New
Car Buyer Protection Act supplants the need for practitioners
to
7
bring automobile warranty suits under Magnuson-Moss. s
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Sadat will have an important effect on interpretation of the New Car Buyer Protection
Act. Both the New Car Buyer Protection Act and the MagnusonMoss Act provide that consumers can obtain replacement of a defective vehicle, without specifically granting injunctive relief, if the
manufacturer does not comply with the consumer's request for replacement. An Illinois court, faced with a manufacturer that refuses
to replace a defective car under the New Car Buyer Protection Act,
will rely on the principles of statutory construction in Sadat for its
interpretation of the lemon law. Statutes in pari materia 7' must be
construed together, and words or phrases interpreted in the same
manner.7 5 Thus, as a result of Sadat, purchasers of new automobiles
tion are admissible as evidence in the subsequent lawsuit. New Car Buyer Protection
Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121/2 §1204 (1983). See also Platt, Lemon Auto Litigation in
Illinois, ILL. B. J. May, 1985 at 508 (admissibility is to encourage judges to dismiss
court actions where the prior arbitral finding goes against consumer).
Arbitrators are under no duty to state the reasons for their decision, Mehany v.
Midwestern Gas Transmission, 103 Ill. App. 3d 144, 430 N.E.2d 1138 (1981).
71. New Car Buyer Protection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2 §1205 (1983). The
Act also provides that an action must be commenced within 18 months after delivery.
Id. §1206. The statute of limitations under the Uniform Commercial Code is four
years, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26 §2-275 (1983). Consumers waive their code remedies
when proceeding under the lemon law. New Car Buyer Protection Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 1211/2 §1205 (1983).
72. See supra note 37 for discussion of manufacturers offering a full warranty.
73. New Car Buyer Protection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §§1201-08 (1983),
extends warranty coverage to all new vehicles, including those without manufacturer
warranties. Id. §1207.
74. Statutes are in "pari materia" when they have the same purpose or object or
relate to the same person or thing. Matter of Robinson, 665 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1981).
75. Jones v. Illinois Dept. of Rehabilitation Servs., 504 F. Supp. 1244 (N.D. Ill.
1981), aff'd, 689 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1982) (unless context of statute indicates otherwise, words or phrases that were used in a prior act pertaining to the same subject
matter will be construed to be used in the same sense).
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in Illinois are now in the same position they were in before enactment of the New Car Buyer Protection Act, Magnuson-Moss and
the Uniform Commercial Code. The Illinois Supreme Court has
struck a death knell to consumer protection and has forced buyers
to return to the days of caveat emptor.
Mark D. Roth

